What is TLS interception (SSL inspection)?
Definition
TLS interception, or SSL inspection, is when a middlebox terminates a client's encrypted connection, reads the plaintext and re-encrypts it onward.
It only works on a client that already trusts the interceptor. The middlebox has to present a certificate for the requested site that the client accepts, which in practice means its own root was installed in the client’s trust store beforehand. That is why it is routine on managed corporate laptops and rare anywhere else.
What the client sees
On 21 October 2026 we ran Squid 6.13 on macOS with two ports: one that only relays CONNECT tunnels and one that performs ssl-bump, Squid’s interception mode, signing certificates with a root we generated for the test. The tools were OpenSSL 4.0.3 and curl 8.23.0.
$ openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| openssl x509 -noout -issuer
issuer=C=US, O=SSL Corporation, CN=Cloudflare TLS Issuing ECC CA 3
$ openssl s_client -proxy 127.0.0.1:3141 -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com \
</dev/null 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer # plain tunnel
issuer=C=US, O=SSL Corporation, CN=Cloudflare TLS Issuing ECC CA 3
$ openssl s_client -proxy 127.0.0.1:3142 -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com \
</dev/null 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer # ssl-bump
issuer=O=Lab, CN=Lab Interception CA
$ curl -sS -x http://127.0.0.1:3142 https://example.com/ -o /dev/null
curl: (60) SSL certificate OpenSSL verify result: self-signed certificate in certificate chain (19)
The tunnel left the real certificate alone. The interceptor replaced it with one for the same name, signed by our root, and curl refused it until we passed --cacert with that root. Then it returned 200. The issuer check is the quickest test for your own network: run it from the suspect machine and from one you control, and compare.
What the server sees
The interceptor does not forward your handshake. It opens its own, so the server records the middlebox. We pointed Chrome 155 and curl at a local server that logs each ClientHello, once through the tunnel port and once through ssl-bump. The connections went to an IP address, so no client sent a server name.
| Client and path | Cipher suites | Extensions | GREASE | ALPN offered | JA3 hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome 155 through a CONNECT tunnel | 15 | 16 | Yes | h2, http/1.1 | 4e863725… |
| Chrome 155 through ssl-bump | 30 | 12 | No | None | b56cf656… |
| curl 8.23.0 through ssl-bump | 30 | 12 | No | None | b56cf656… |
Two different clients arrived as one identical handshake, Squid’s. GREASE values are left out of the counts, as JA3 does. With no ALPN offered, the server also falls back to HTTP/1.1, so the browser’s HTTP/2 fingerprint disappears along with its TLS fingerprint. How distinct client handshakes normally are is measured in Chromium varied all 12 captured handshakes. curl and Go stayed the same across 3 each.
The same mismatch is how interception is detected from the server side. Durumeric and colleagues compared the claimed User-Agent with the handshake that actually arrived, and over one week in their 2017 NDSS paper found interception on 4.0% of Firefox update connections, 6.2% of connections to a set of e-commerce sites, and 10.9% of U.S. connections to Cloudflare. Of the intercepted connections, 97% on the Firefox servers, 32% on the e-commerce sites and 54% on Cloudflare ended up less secure than the client would have negotiated alone.
For a scraper the lesson is short. A job that behaves differently on one network, with a fingerprint you did not choose and failures confined to one office, may have an interceptor in the path. Pinned clients and client certificates fail there by design, because the middlebox cannot present the pinned key or hold your private key.
Working behind an interceptor you are told to trust
Give each tool the organisation’s root explicitly, rather than turning verification off. Disabling verification accepts any interceptor, including a hostile one.
- curl:
--cacert root.pem, or theCURL_CA_BUNDLEvariable. - Python requests:
REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE; requests 2.32.3 also readsCURL_CA_BUNDLE. - pip:
--cert root.pem. - Node 24.2.0:
NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, or--use-system-cato read the system store. - npm: the
cafilesetting. - git:
http.sslCAInfo, or theGIT_SSL_CAINFOvariable.
These are the same tools whose proxy settings are covered in proxies for git, npm and pip and HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY and NO_PROXY explained. The curl table under reading the errors lists the other exit codes you meet through a proxy, including 35, a failed handshake, which can also mean an interceptor on the path.